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Ho Tung Gardens Saga and the 
Basis of Compensation Under 
The Antiquities and Monuments 
Ordinance: A Comparative 




Regulatory schemes that mandate historical preservation for private property 
are increasingly common. This article employs the attempt to preserve Ho Tung 
Gardens as a case study to examine problems in the design of compensation 
measures for such schemes. The compensation provision of Antiquities and 
Monuments Ordinance (Cap 53) is ambiguously worded, and this article 
argues that this Ordinance provides compensation only for the additional costs 
associated with the maintenance of historical buildings and does not compensate 
owners for property value depreciation. However, this article also argues from an 
incentive perspective that adequate compensation should be provided to property 
owners for such depreciation to ensure that the government and the public 
duly account for the true costs of heritage conservation. In addition, adequate 
compensation eliminates the perverse incentives for owners to preemptively 
demolish historical buildings in order to avoid the regulatory regime. This article 
draws on similar legislative experiences in the UK to propose guidelines for 
reforming the compensation provision.
I. Introduction
The topic of heritage conservation has frequently been controversial. At 
the root of the controversy lies the tension between preserving historical 
buildings, on the one hand, and embracing economic development, on 
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the other.1 This tension is particularly acute when private entities own 
the historical buildings. Owing to increased public awareness about the 
importance of heritage conservation, jurisdictions around the globe have 
enacted legislative schemes to mandate the preservation of privately 
owned historical buildings.2 Such legislation pits the public interest in 
heritage conservation against the rights of private property owners to 
develop the property. Aggravating matters is the absence of adequate 
compensation for economic losses suffered by private owners as a result 
of development restrictions. Because of the substantial diminution of 
property value, imposing legal restrictions on private property is properly 
conceived of as a form of regulatory takings.3 However, neither the 
provision nor the adequacy of compensation is typically mandated by 
the constitutional protection of property against government takings.4 
This has resulted in a wide array of compensation measures among the 
different legal regimes – if any are provided at all.
This article utilises the attempted preservation of Ho Tung Gardens – 
an important historical mansion located in a prime residential area in 
Hong Kong5 – to examine the pitfalls in the design of compensation 
regimes for historical preservation. Under Antiquities and Monuments 
Ordinance (Cap 53) (the “Ordinance”),6 the government has the power 
to declare a historical building a monument and prohibit all development 
that is incompatible with heritage conservation.7 Compensation for 
private owners is provided for, although vaguely described as what 
the court “thinks [is] reasonable in the circumstances”.8 The Ho Tung 
Gardens  saga began in 2010 when the owner, in a typical attempt to 
realise the economic potential of the site, applied for a building permit to 
demolish the mansion and to construct new residential buildings worth 
HK$3 billion (US$ 380 million).9 Despite the widely acknowledged 
1 Matthew Brown and Richard L Stroup, “Markets Versus Takings and Regulation: Deciding the 
Future of the Past” in Bruce L Benson (ed), Property Rights: Eminent Domain and Regulatory 
Takings Re-Examined (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 211, 211–212; Michael Ross, Planning and the 
Heritage: Policy and Procedures (E & FN Spon, 2nd ed, 1996) 1–9.
2 For a survey on the various legal regimes of historical conservation, see generally Consuelo 
Olimpia Sanz Salla, The Protection of Historic Properties: A Comparative Study of Administrative 
Policies (Wit Press, 2009).
3 For a detailed exposition of the conceptual and legal issues relating to regulatory takings, see 
generally Steven J Eagle, Regulatory Takings (Lexis Nexis, 3rd ed, 2005).
4 Stephen L Kass, Judith M LaBelee and David A Hansell, Rehabilitating Older and Historic 
Buildings (John Wiley & Sons, 2nd ed, 1993) 209–219.
5 See below Part II.B.1.
6 Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance (Cap 53).
7 Ibid., ss 3 and 6. See below Part II.A.
8 Ibid., s 9(2),. See below Part III.
9 Joyce Ng, “Ho Tung Mansion Saved from Demolition”, South China Morning Post (HK), 26 
January 2011,p 1.
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historical signifi cance of Ho Tung Gardens,10 the government ultimately 
did not declare the site a monument because of the potential hefty 
compensation payable to the owner under the Ordinance.11
This article makes three arguments in relation to the Ho Tung Gardens 
saga. The fi rst is a relatively narrow legal argument that the assumption 
of hefty compensation that dominated both the public debate and the 
government calculus is not grounded in valid legal principles. A careful 
examination of the text of the Ordinance, the relevant legislative debate 
and the background case law on regulatory takings indicates that the 
compensation payable under the Ordinance is simply the additional costs 
associated with maintaining the historical buildings, as opposed to the 
commonly held assumption that the depreciation in land value and/or 
the loss of redevelopment value would be payable to owners of property 
under the Ordinance.
The second argument is a broader normative argument from the 
incentive perspective that the assumption of signifi cant compensation, 
although not legally required under the Ordinance, is a normatively 
desirable benchmark. Compensation for the depreciation in land value 
and/or loss of redevelopment facilitates a more accurate assessment of the 
true costs of heritage conservation. In turn, this promotes a more informed 
public discourse about whether the historical preservation of a particular 
site is indeed socially desirable. Moreover, it helps avoid the perverse 
incentives for owners of old buildings to pre-emptively demolish or alter 
the buildings in order to avoid the fi nancially damaging restrictions that 
are the consequence of being declared a monument.
In addition, the incentive perspective reveals the illogical distinction 
drawn in the Ordinance between in-kind compensation and monetary 
compensation. Only compensation paid out in cash is subject to the 
mandatory legislative oversight of budgetary control, while there are limited 
checks on how the executive branch utilises in-kind compensation (eg 
land exchange and benefi cial land use regulatory actions) to compensate 
the affected owners.12 However, both in-kind and monetary compensation 
are economically valuable to the recipients and economically costly to the 
providers. The public at large suffers both when the in-kind compensation 
paid out can be monetised to a larger quantum than the legally required 
amount, and when the exercise of regulatory powers is driven by 
10 Joyce Man and Joyce Ng, “Keep Historic Estate Intact, Adviser Urges”, South China Morning 
Post (HK), 11 October 2011, p 3; Joyce Ng, “Gardens a Living Reminder of our Colonial Past, 
Says Historians” South China Morning Post (HK), 26 January 2011, p 1; Olga Wong and Joyce 
Ng, “Public to Grade 1,400 Sites”, South China Morning Post (HK), 20 March 2009, p 1.
11 See below Part II.B.3.
12 See below Part IV.C.
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compensation requirements rather than by the original policy objectives of 
the regulatory scheme. Nevertheless, the case study of Hong Kong confi rms 
that the perverse incentive created by this disparity in legal treatment of the 
in-kind and monetary compensation does induce the executive branch to 
rely excessively on the former while being unduly averse towards the latter.
Reform is thus necessary. Together with a comparative analysis of the 
UK legal regime, this article outlines a set of guidelines to reform the 
compensation provision under the Ordinance and similar legislation. In 
particular, compensation must be adequate. The depreciation of property 
value utilised in the UK legal regime is a viable benchmark. However, 
any reform should avoid the current UK legal position that excludes from 
compensation the reduction in land value caused by other regulatory 
schemes, even if the regulatory burdens are advanced for the purposes of 
heritage conservation.13 In addition, the compensation scheme should avoid 
distinguishing between in-kind compensation and monetary compensation.
This article is organised into six parts. Part II sets out the basic 
framework of the Ordinance and the case study of the Ho Tung Gardens 
saga. Part III critically examines the basis of compensation under the 
Ordinance and concludes that the commonly held assumptions during the 
Ho Tung Gardens saga that the Ordinance mandated hefty compensation 
were legally incorrect. Part IV utilises an incentive perspective to 
highlight the merits of adequate compensation on both the government 
decision-making process and on the incentives of private property owners 
to preserve historical buildings. Part V draws on the UK experience to 
propose reform of the compensation provision under the Ordinance and 
similar legislation. Part VI concludes the article.
II. The Ho Tung Gardens Saga
A. Basic Legal Framework in Hong Kong
The Ordinance was enacted in 1971 (and has been effective since 1976) 
when Hong Kong was a British colony.14 Considered long overdue,15 the 
Ordinance was the fi rst legislation specifi cally dedicated to protecting 
local heritage. Under the Ordinance, the Secretary for Development 
(hereinafter, the “Secretary”) is authorised and responsible for preserving 
13 See below Part V.A.2.
14 For an account of the political and legal history of Hong Kong, see Johannes Chan, “From 
Colony to Special Administrative Region” in Johannes Chan and CL Lim (eds), Law of the 
Hong Kong Constitution (Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 3, 5–12.
15 Offi cial Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 3 November 1971, 
180, 182.
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16 Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance (Cap 53) s 2. For a discussion of the administrative 
structure, see David Lung, “Built Heritage in Transition: A Critique of Hong Kong’s 
Conservation Movement and the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance” (2012) 42 Hong 
Kong Law Journal. 121, 124–125; Gordon N Cruden, Land Compensation and Valuation Law in 
Hong Kong (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2009) 38.
17 Cruden (n 16 above), p 38. Under Hong Kong current political institution arrangement, the 
Chief Executive is the head of government, akin to the Governor of Hong Kong under British 
colonial rule: see Benny Tai, “The Chief Executive” in Chan and Lim (n 14 above), p 181 
(discussing the appointment and powers of the Chief Executive).
18 For example, Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance (Cap 53) s 11(4).
19 Ibid., s 3. For general discussion, see Cruden, (n 16 above), pp 38–40.
20 Ibid., s 6.
21 Ibid., s 2A. The approval of the Chief Executive is necessary before the Secretary can make 
a declaration of monument, but is not required for the provisional power of declaration of 
proposed monument.
22 Ibid., s 2B.
23 Ibid., ss 2C and 4.
24 Ibid., ss 2C(6) and 4(6. The Chief Executive in Council, or Executive Council, is an advisory 
body to the Chief Executive under the Basic Law and arguably serves the role of a cabinet in a 
British parliamentary system: see Richard Cullen, Xiaonan Yang and Christine Loh, “Executive 
Government” in Chan and Lim (n 14 above), pp 249, 257–258.
25 See Chu Hoi Dick v Secretary of Home Affairs (unrep., HCAL 87/2007, [2007] HKEC 1471) 
(CFI) (dismissing the challenge against the administrative decision under the Ordinance of not 
declaring Queen’s Pier a monument).
objects of historical, archaeological and paleontological interest.16 The 
Secretary is advised by the Antiquities Advisory Board, which is established 
under s 17 of the Ordinance and consists of individuals appointed by the 
Chief Executive.17 The approval of the Chief Executive is necessary for 
signifi cant decisions, such as paying private entities under the Ordinance.18
The main thrust of the Ordinance is the power to declare that certain 
premises are monuments.19 Once declared a monument, no demolition, 
alteration or other construction work can be undertaken on the premises 
without a permit from the Secretary.20 A provisional power to declare the 
premise a proposed monument was added in 1982 to provide for interim 
restraints on development until a decision on the status of the premises is 
fi nalised.21 Declaring a site a proposed monument has a maximum validity 
period of 12 months and cannot be extended with respect to privately 
owned sites.22
The safeguards against these potential far-reaching restrictions on 
private property are primarily twofold. First, the Ordinance provides 
avenues for objections by the owner or lawful occupier of the affected 
property.23 However, this is only an internal administrative appeal that 
ends with the Chief Executive in Council.24 Although judicial review 
of the Chief Executive’s decision is not precluded, the review would be 
limited to whether the decision has been made in accordance with the 
relevant legislative provisions and other common law principles that 
ensure that the process was procedurally and substantively fair.25
HKLJ3-4 Chen Jianlin-Ho Tung gardens(17102013).indd   839 12/14/13   7:24 PM
840 Chen Jianlin (2013) HKLJ
Second, the Ordinance provides for a right of compensation for the 
“fi nancial loss” caused by the refusal to grant a construction permit.26 The 
amount of the compensation should be either agreed upon by the Secretary 
and the owner of the affected property27 or assessed by the District Court 
as to what “it thinks reasonable in the circumstances”.28 As is immediately 
apparent from the wording of the statutory provisions, little guidance is 
provided with respect to the compensation. The ambiguity as to what is 
“reasonable in the circumstances” is highlighted in the recent Ho Tung 
Gardens saga discussed in the next section.
B. The Attempted Preservation of Ho Tung Gardens
1. Historical signifi cance
The historical signifi cance of Ho Tung Gardens refl ects an important, 
if unsavoury, aspect of the colonial history of Hong Kong. The Peak, a 
prime residential area on Hong Kong Island, was governed by exclusionary 
zoning that prohibited non-Europeans from residing there.29 Ho Tung 
Gardens was the fi rst and only exception to the racial zoning, when the 
Eurasian Ho Tung was granted permission to build a Chinese-style garden 
(and accompanying mansion) on the Peak in 1927 in appreciation for 
mediating a strike that spread through Guangzhou and Hong Kong.30 The 
site covers 120,000 square feet and incorporates a Chinese renaissance 
architectural style.31 There is general consensus among conservation 
experts on the important historical value of Ho Tung Gardens.32 The 
premises was classifi ed as a Grade I historic site in 2009,33 which is the 
highest grade given and refl ects the “outstanding merit” of the premises.34 
Grading is based on expert assessment of the following six criteria: historic 
26 Ibid., s 8.
27 Ibid., s 8(2)(a).
28 Ibid., s 9(2).
29 Gillis Heller and Daphne SW Wong, ‘The History of Exclusionary Zoning Laws in Hong Kong’ 
(2010) 40 Hong Kong Law Journal 609, 614–618.
30 Ng (n 10 above).
31 Ibid.
32 Man and Ng (n 10 above); Ng (n 10 above). There are some commentators who are sceptical 
of the premise’s heritage signifi cance, although none proclaimed any particular expertise on 
the matter: Albert Cheng, “Due Process”, South China Morning Post (HK), 17 March 2012, p 
15; Jake van Der Kamp, “Let’s Face it: the Ho Tung Garden’s House has no Merit”, South China 
Morning Post (HK), 30 October 2011, p 16.
33 Wong and Ng (n 10 above).
34 There are three grades under the scheme: Grade I are given to buildings of outstanding merit 
for which every effort should be made to preserve; Grade II are for buildings of special merit 
for which efforts should selectively be made to preserve; Grade III are for buildings of some 
merit but not yet qualifi ed for consideration as possible monuments: see Lung (n 16 above), 
pp 126–127; Cruden, (n 16 above), pp 38–39.
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value, architectural value, social value, rarity, authenticity and group 
value.35 The grading system is independent of the Ordinance and has 
no legal effect; it merely serves as an internal guideline for conservation 
efforts.36
2. Declaration of proposed monument
The saga offi cially began at the end of 2010, when grand-daughter of 
Ho Tung and owner of the premises, applied for a building permit to 
demolish the mansion and build 11 blocks of four-storey houses on the 
site.37 Restricted to evaluating the plan’s structural safety issues, the 
Building Department issued an approval in December 2010 but alerted 
heritage offi cials.38 The development plan would yield 60,000 square feet 
of residential fl oor area and was estimated to be worth HK$3 billion at the 
then-market price of approximately HK$50,000 per square foot.39
Government offi cials attempted to negotiate with the owner about the 
preservation issues, including incentives and assistance in maintenance 
but indicated that they were rebuffed.40 The application and approval of 
the building permit prompted the Secretary to declare Ho Tung Gardens 
a proposed monument on 28 January 2011. This temporarily halted the 
demolition of the mansion and bought time for continued negotiations.41
3. The negotiation process
During the negotiation process, both parties advanced different offers after 
the proposed monument declaration. The owner offered to preserve the 
Chinese garden but knock down the mansion, although this was rejected 
because expert advisers to the Antiquities Advisory Board indicated that 
conservation required the preservation of the entire estate.42 The Secretary 
offered a land swap of a site adjacent to the premises, which was zoned as 
a green belt and was reputed to have similar vistas and land values as the 
Ho Tung Gardens.43 The land swap was rejected by the owner, who wrote 
to the press stressing that her decision was not motivated by profi t but by 
35 Wong and Ng (n 10 above).
36 Lung (n 16 above), pp 126–127; Cruden (n 16 above), pp 38–39.
37 Ng (n 9 above). Ms Ho objected to the grade-one historic rating in 2009 on grounds that Ho 
Tung did not live there for long, there was no important family events held there, and the 
building’s interior had been considerably altered: Ng (n 10 above).
38 Ng (n 9 above).
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Joyce Ng, “Ho Tung Gardens Owners Told of Listing”, South China Morning Post, 29 January 
2011, p 3.
42 Man and Ng (n 10 above).
43 Joyce Ng, “Land Swap Offers to Save Historic Peak Villa”, South China Morning Post, 22 October 
2011, p 1.
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her desire to continue to live on the site as a homeowner by replacing the 
mansion with 10 “tasteful cottages”.44
After the one-year deadline lapsed, the government made a last-ditch 
offer that permitted the original 5,800 square meters of residential space 
to be developed but required the preservation of the façade of the main 
building, but this was rejected.45 Both parties decided to wait until a new 
Chief Executive was in power because the outgoing Chief Executive 
Donald Tsang was disinclined to make a decision.46 In December 2012, 
the new administration announced that it had given up plans to save the 
site.47 The Secretary explained that the decision was fi nancial in nature 
because the government was reluctant to spend billions in public funds 
on private heritage sites.48
4. The unresolved question of compensation
The Ho Tung Gardens saga is notable for the assumptions that were 
commonly made regarding the compensation in the public discourse. The 
Secretary and lawmakers all noted that there was uncertainty regarding 
the compensation level the court will award.49 The chairman of the 
Antiquities Advisory Board, Bernard Chan, opined that it might be good 
for this case to go to court to set a precedential benchmark about the price 
of conservation.50 However, the fi gure of HK$3 billion (the estimated 
value of the redevelopment plans) was often referred to as the likely 
amount of compensation that would have been awarded.51 Letters in the 
press frequently mentioned the same HK$3 billion fi gure as the price tag 
to preserve Ho Tung Gardens,52 and this perception was also refl ected by 
lawmakers.53 The various offers made to the owner by the Secretary were 
similarly based on the assumption that a hefty compensation would be 
payable for the loss in redevelopment potential.
44 Joyce Ng, “Ho Tung Villa Owner Fights Back”, South China Morning Post, 26 October 
2011, p 3.
45 Joyce Ng, “Proposal to Save Mansion Rejected”, South China Morning Post, 8 March 
2012, p 1.
46 Joyce Ng, “Tsang Still Undecided on Peak Garden Plan”, South China Morning Post, 14 June 
2012, p 3.
47 Joyce Ng and Olga Wong, “Heritage Policy Failure as Peak Mansion to Go”, South China 
Morning Post, 5 December 2012, p 1.
48 Joyce Ng and Olga Wong, “Double U-turn as Ho Tung Plan is Abandoned”, South China Morning 
Post, 5 December 2012, p 1.
49 Joyce Ng, “Taxpayers Face HK$3b Bill for Mansion”, South China Morning Post, 25 October 
2011, p 1.
50 Ng (n 42 above).
51 Ng and Wong (n 47 above); Man and Ng (n 10 above).
52 “Letters”, South China Morning Post, 3 November 2011, p 16 (Lila Ho: “However, one problem 
is that preserving the house could cost taxpayers HK$3 billion”; Mark Peaker: “HK$3 billion 
could be used to build a new children’s hospital, or better care facilities for the elderly”).
53 Ng (n 42 above).
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There were dissenting views about the basis of compensation that 
should arise from a declaration of monument. During the negotiations 
after the lapse of the one-year proposed monument declaration, a 
consultancy report commissioned by Heritage Hong Kong Foundation, 
a private non-profi t organisation, argued that the compensation should 
be the net present value of the forgone rental value of the 10 cottages, 
estimated at approximately HK$200 million.54 William Meacham, a 
former board member of the Antiquities Advisory Board, went even 
further in arguing that the compensation provision under the Ordinance 
is limited to fi nancial losses caused by governmental actions in inspecting, 
repairing and excavating the site.55
III. The Legal Basis of Compensation
What then is the proper legal basis for compensation under the 
Ordinance arising from a monument declaration? This part resolves this 
unfortunately unanswered issue by critically examining the statutory 
wordings, legislative background and relevant case laws on regulatory 
takings.
A. Statutory Wordings
Compensation arising from the declaration of the monument is set forth 
in ss 8 and 9 of the Ordinance.
Section 8: Compensation
 (1) Subject to this section, the Authority may, with the prior 
approval of the Chief Executive, pay to the owner or lawful 
occupier of a proposed monument or monument compensation 
in respect of fi nancial loss suffered or likely to be suffered by him 
by reason of (Amended 59 of 2000 s 3):
(a) the exercise by the Authority, or by a designated person 
authorized by him, of the powers specifi ed in s 5(1); or
(b) a refusal to grant a permit or any conditions imposed in a 
permit.
54 Joyce Ng, “Bid to Break Heritage Deadlock”, South China Morning Post, 12 March 2012, 
p 1.
55 Joyce Ng, “Potential Peak Mansion Lifeline Rejected by Board”, South China Morning Post, 18 
December 2011, p 4.
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 (2) The compensation shall be such amount as may be:
(a) agreed between the Authority and the owner or lawful 
occupier of the proposed monument or monument; or
(b) assessed by the District Court under s 9.
 (3) No compensation shall be awarded under this section in respect 
of fi nancial loss that has been or may be suffered in connection 
with a contract made or anything done by the owner or lawful 
occupier of the proposed monument or monument after the 
service of a notice under s 2A(4) or 4(2).
Section 9: Assessment of Compensation by District Court
 (1) In default of agreement under s 8(2)(a), the owner or lawful 
occupier may apply to the District Court to assess the amount 
of compensation payable under s 8.
 (2) The District Court may, on such application, award to the 
applicant such compensation as it thinks reasonable in the 
circumstances.
The defi ciencies and ambiguities in the wording are immediately 
apparent. There is no expressly provided benchmark for compensation 
in the event that the government and property owner cannot agree on 
the quantum of compensation. Assessment by the District Court56 under 
s 9 merely provides for “such compensation as it [the District Court] 
thinks reasonable in the circumstances”. The sole tangible guidance is 
from s 8(1), which states that the compensation is “in respect of fi nancial 
loss suffered or likely to be suffered by him [owner or lawful occupier] by 
reason of” either the s 5(1) provision (provision of power of entry and 
repair) or “a refusal to grant a permit or any conditions imposed in a 
permit”.57
This lack of specifi city contrasts starkly with compensation provisions 
set forth in other Hong Kong ordinances that involve infringement of 
private interests in land. The most obvious example is the statue for 
compulsory acquisition of land, with ss 10–12 of the Lands Resumption 
Ordinance (Cap 124)58 setting out in detail the assessment method for the 
56 The District Court usually involves a District judge sitting alone, but the judge may allow not 
more than two assessors to sit with him on a purely advisory basis: Cruden (n 16 above), p 42.
57 This is pursuant to the power under s 6(1) that stipulates a permit by the Authority is needed 
before any construction work can be undertaken on the declared (or proposed) monument.
58 Lands Resumption Ordinance (Cap 124).
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damages payable. Similarly, the Mass Transit Railway (Land Resumption 
and Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 276)59 has an entire attached 
schedule to specify the basis on which compensation is to be assessed for 
each of the various losses that may be claimed.
Signifi cantly, this contrast in specifi city between the ordinances is not 
the result of timing. The Mass Transit Railway (Land Resumption and 
Related Provisions) Ordinance was enacted in 1974, contemporaneous 
with the Ordinance that was enacted in 1971 and implemented in 1976. 
Although the Land Resumption Ordinance has been in force since the late 
nineteenth century, the detailed provisions on compensation were added 
in 1974.60 Nor can the difference be explained by the regulatory taking 
nature of the Ordinance. The Mass Transit Railway (Land Resumption 
and Related Provisions) Ordinance expressly allows claims of loss that 
arise from the refusal or withdrawal of permits by the Building Authority, 
with the basis of compensation set as the reduction of the market value of 
the land as a result of the refusal or withdrawal.61
Indeed, the absence of compensation guidance in the Ordinance is 
best highlighted by comparison with the contemporaneous Country Parks 
Ordinance (Cap 208).62 The Country and Parks Ordinance was enacted 
in 1976 to designate and manage country parks in Hong Kong. It shares 
a legislative framework that resembles the Ordinance. As with the effect 
of monument declaration under the Ordinance, s 10 of the Country and 
Parks Ordinance provides that no new development may be undertaken 
on a site in the area without approval after the premises is designated as 
part of a country park.63 Compensation is set forth in a specifi c provision 
for losses arising out of the refusal to grant approvals for development.64 
However, unlike the Ordinance, the specifi c basis of compensation 
assessment is clearly demarcated. In particular, the reduction of land value 
resulting from the refusal to grant development approval is explicitly 
claimable65 under parameters set forth in the calculation of land value.66
59 Mass Transit Railway (Land Resumption and Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 276) Sch I 
(Part I).
60 Cruden (n 16 above), pp 13–14.
61 Mass Transit Railway (Land Resumption and Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 276) ss 10 
and 11, Sch I (Part I), (n 59 above) (expenses and fees accrued pursuant to an approved plan 
are also claimable upon withdrawal).
62 Country Parks Ordinance (Cap 208).
63 Ibid., s 10. See Cruden, (n 16 above), pp 227–230.
64 Ibid., s 19.
65 Ibid., s 19(2).
66 For example, land value should be assessed in accordance with the Lands Resumption Ordinance: 
s 19(4), while no account shall be taken of any increase or decrease in the value of land that is 
attributable to the country park designation: Country Parks Ordinance (Cap 208)s 19(3).
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B. Legislative History
The conspicuous ambiguity in the compensation provision of the 
Ordinance is not a legislative oversight. The issue of compensation 
was actually raised in the Ordinance’s legislative debate. In response to 
criticism from a lawmaker (Mr Cheung) about the possible arbitrariness 
that might fl ow from the determination of compensation by the Authority 
rather than an independent tribunal,67 then-Secretary of Home Affairs 
(DCC Luddington) explained that “such compensation would not be in 
regard to any expropriation of land”.68 Rather, the “compensation payable 
under this clause of the bill would be in relation to, for instance, the 
requirement to retain a building or portion of a building in its existing 
condition and not to demolish it”.69 He also observed that such assessment 
had not been attempted before in Hong Kong and “will have to be the 
subject of some experiment”.70
It is notable that there was no apparent reference to parallel UK 
provisions during the legislative debate.71 Indeed, expressly disavowing 
expropriation is signifi cant in light of UK compensation provisions that 
expressly provide the basis of compensation to include, among other factors, 
the diminution of property value arising from the monument declaration.72 
Such specifi c and relatively generous grounds for compensation were 
provided largely because the reference point for compensation under 
UK legislation has been, since its earliest manifestation, compulsory 
acquisition.73
The criticism by Mr Cheung resulted in modifi cation of the structure 
of the compensation provisions. The original scheme envisioned that the 
amount of compensation would be determined by the Authority with a 
right of appeal to the District Court.74 This was amended into the current 
form that provides for initial negotiation between the Authority and the 
land owner.75
67 Offi cial Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong.), 17 November 1971, 218.
68 Ibid., p 220.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 While the UK Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act was only enacted in 
1979, it was mainly a consolidation of existing laws that include the Historic Buildings and 
Ancient Monuments Act of 1953 (Ch 49). Section 12 of this Historic Buildings and Ancient 
Monuments Act of 1953 provided for compensation to persons whose interests in the declared 
monument is “injuriously affected” by the declaration or “suffers damages” because of refusal to 
grant approval for construction works. For a discussion of the legislative evolution, see Simon 
Halfi n, “The Legal Protection of Cultural Property in Britain: Past, Present and Future” (1995) 
6 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 1, 3–13.
72 See below PartV.A.
73 Joseph L. Sax, “Is Anyone Minding Stonehenge? The Origins of Cultural Property Protection 
in England’ (1990) 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1543, 1547 and 1565; Halfi n (n 71 above), pp 3–7.
74 Offi cial Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 3 November 1971, 183.
75 Offi cial Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 1 December 1971, 256–257.
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C. Case Law on Regulatory Takings
The restrictions on redevelopment accompanying monument declaration 
are essentially a form of regulatory takings – ie diminishing private 
property interests through government regulations. In the case of Ho 
Tung Gardens, a monument declaration would have deprived the owner 
of the substantial sales revenue from the ten luxury cottages to be built 
on the demolished site. As opposed to compensation that is widely 
expected whenever property interests are acquired by the state outright, 
compensation for regulatory takings is much more controversial.
The issue was clarifi ed in Hong Kong by the seminal case of Fine Tower 
Associates Ltd v Town Planning Board.76 The case arose from a challenge 
to property protection under Art 105 of the Basic Law (Hong Kong’s 
de facto constitution). The Court of Appeal defi ned the legal test of 
regulatory takings as whether there is “de facto deprivation” in which 
there is “the removal of any meaningful use, of all economically viable 
use”.77 This approach represents the court’s survey of the UK/European 
approach of “de facto deprivation” in Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden and 
Grape Bay Ltd v A-G of Bermuda in addition to the US regulatory takings 
jurisprudence from Lucas v South Carolina Costal Council and Penn Central 
Transportation Co v City of New York.78 The court noted the relevance of 
“investment-back expectations” as a factor to consider79 and observed that 
in Hong Kong, “[i]t is an incident of ownership that the uses permitted 
by the authorities may change. Land is purchased with that knowledge, 
actual or imputed”.80 Applying the test, the court dismissed the claim by 
the property owner, fi nding that the reduction of height restrictions from 
85 meters to 35 meters and the imposition of the new 44 per cent open 
space requirement continued to allow for considerable development and 
does not approximate an unconstitutional deprivation of property.81
The regulatory takings principle enunciated in Fine Tower Associates 
Ltd v Town Planning Board has been applied subsequently in two reported 
Hong Kong cases. Both cases involve only lower trial courts, but the 
application to the facts is illustrative. The fi rst case, Man Yee Transport Bus 
Co Ltd v Transport Tribunal,82 involved the cancellation of the passenger 
service license and vehicle license of a bus as sanctions for providing 
76 [2008] 1 HKLRD 553 (CA). For a discussion of the case and the relevant principles, see Michael 
Wilkinson, “Land” in Chan and Lim (n 14 above), pp 359, 392–394.
77 Fine Tower Associates Ltd v Town Planning Board (n 76 above), p 564.
78 Ibid., pp 560–564.
79 Ibid., pp 562–563.
80 Ibid., pp 567.
81 Ibid., pp 565–569.
82 (unrep., HCAL 122/2008, [2008] HKEC 1775) (CFI).
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unauthorised bus services. The court rejected the challenge based on Art 
105 and observed that, although revocation of the licenses prevented 
the bus owner from using the vehicle on the roads in Hong Kong, the 
bus could be sold for good value in the second-hand market or could be 
used outside Hong Kong.83 The second case, Oriental Generation Ltd v 
Town Planning Board,84 involved zoning restrictions imposed by the Town 
Planning Board. The court affi rmed the principles on regulatory takings 
set out in Fine Tower Associates Ltd v Town Planning Board in obiter85 after 
quashing the restrictions on the basis of arbitrariness.86 It is notable that 
the court recognised the validity of the Town Planning Board’s authority 
to take nearby historical sites into account in drawing up zoning maps.87
D. Summary: Loss in Redevelopment Value Not Compensable
Gordon N Cruden, former president of the Hong Kong Land Tribunal, 
opined in his academic work that “general principles of compensation 
would apply” to the Ordinance, with the courts seeking to “ascertain the 
extent to which the market value of the land had been diminished as a 
consequence of the [monument declaration]”.88 This is despite Cruden’s 
acknowledgement that the District Court “is given a wide discretion 
to assess compensation” under s 9(2).89 Indeed, his references to other 
ordinances in which compensation is payable for diminution in value90 
does not support his intuition because those ordinances authorising 
compensation for diminution in value typically have express wordings 
setting out that particular basis of compensation.91
Indeed, the failure to mention compensation for diminution of land 
values in the vague wording of the Ordinance arguably refl ects a legislative 
intention that does not envision such compensation. As observed in the 
legislative debate, the provision of compensation was primarily based on 
costs associated with maintaining historical buildings in their original 
state. This refl ects the logical concern in historical conservation that 
83 Ibid., [13]–[15] (CFI). For a critical discussion of this case, see Oliver Jones, “Right to Property” 
in Chan and Lim (n 14 above), pp 913, 924–925.
84 [2012] 3 HKC 369 (CFI).
85 Ibid., [89]–[90].
86 Ibid., [61]–[82].
87 Ibid., [7] (they include one grade 1 listed building and one grade 3 listed building).
88 Cruden (n 16 above), p 42.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 See Mass Transit Railway (Land Resumption and Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 276), 
Country Parks Ordinance (Cap 208) and Lands Resumption Ordinance(Cap 124), discussed in 
above Part III.A.
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extra expenses are unavoidable in preserving buildings in their original 
state.92 However, this departs from the framework of UK provisions that 
are premised on the compulsorily government acquisition of land. This is 
also unlike the other two contemporaneous pieces of legislation, the Mass 
Transit Railway (Land Resumption and Related Provisions) Ordinance 
and the Country Parks Ordinance, which expressly contemplate 
compensation based on reductions in land values caused by development 
restrictions.
Importantly, the provisions of compensation for loss in market value 
arising from the refusal of the Building Authority to grant permits for 
development was specifi cally inserted into the Mass Transit Railway (Land 
Resumption and Related Provisions) Ordinance only after the issue was 
raised during the legislative debate of the second and third readings.93 
Indeed, the Attorney General proposing the bill emphasised that the 
compensation amendment is “solely in the context of the mass transit 
railway” and stated that “[i]t must not be assumed that the Government’s 
agreement to change in this respect is setting a precedent for the future in 
relation to other public works or projects for the benefi t of the community 
as a whole”.94
In addition, the compensation for the Ordinance must be interpreted 
in light of the regulatory takings baseline established under Fine Towers 
Association. The monument declaration under the Ordinance is unlikely 
to result in “the removal of any meaningful use, of all economically viable 
use”. Section 5(3) of the Ordinance provides that the owner and parties 
authorised by the owner could not be excluded from any part of the 
monuments, ie the owner remains free to utilise the premise in its existing 
state. More importantly, monument declaration does not preclude all 
development. Development plans that do not involve demolition or 
substantial alterations to the historical structure are not likely to be 
refused, as evidenced by the proposals advanced by the Secretary during 
the negotiations over Ho Tung Gardens. Monument declaration under 
92 Charles Mnynors, Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas (Pearson, 2nd ed, 1995) 121.
93 Offi cial Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 17 July 1974, 1027; Offi cial 
Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 14 August 1974, 1180.
94 Offi cial Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 14 August 1974, 1161. 
While the Attorney General also stated that this issue of compensation would be refl ected 
in the substantial review of the Town Planning Ordinance: id., it is telling that no form of 
compensation was ultimately provided in the Town Planning Ordinance (Cap 131) itself. The 
issue of compensation did not generate any debate during the enactment of the Country Parks 
Ordinance (Cap 208), but the reason is probably that the detailed and relatively generous 
compensation provisions have already been in place in the bill at the fi rst reading: see Offi cial 
Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 7 January 1976, 382–386; Offi cial 
Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 10 March 1976, 637–648.
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the Ordinance is not a prima facie unconstitutional infringement of 
private property and does not require compensation.
Thus, this article submits that assuming that the Ordinance 
contemplates considerable compensation for the loss of development 
rights is legally incorrect. The express wording and legislative intent of the 
Ordinance indicates a compensation basis and an approach to assessment 
that is distinct from the conventional reduction in land value envisioned 
in contemporaneous and similar legislation. Given the high threshold of 
regulatory burdens necessary to invoke compensation under the existing 
regulatory takings doctrine in Hong Kong, the District Court will be 
on solid legal ground in awarding compensation under the Ordinance 
primarily based on additional out-of-pocket maintenance and repair costs 
required by mandate to preserve the property.
In any event, it is notable that the hefty compensation fi gure assumed 
in the Ho Tung Gardens saga is erroneous because of simple arithmetic. 
Even if the compensation should be calculated by the diminution of 
property value caused by the monument declaration, the fact that the 
redevelopment can generate HK$3 billion in sale revenue by no means 
implies that the compensation should be set as HK$3 billion. In addition 
to deducting the costs necessary for development, the compensation 
amount must be further reduced by the value of the existing property.95 
The latter fact is not trivial because it would have remained a luxury 
mansion in a prime location. Moreover, although the restrictions on 
development inherent in a monument declaration would result in a 
decrease in property value, it did not prohibit all development. The loss 
arising from the refusal to allow the HK$3 billion redevelopment must 
be mitigated by the possibility of alternative developments that would be 
approved.
IV. An Incentive Perspective in Regulatory Takings
The absence of a legal basis for substantial compensation under the 
Ordinance does not necessarily discount the merits of such compensation. 
This part argues that paying signifi cant compensation under the 
Ordinance, although not a legal requirement thereunder, is a normatively 
desirable benchmark from an incentive perspective.
95 In Hui Sui Sam v Director of Public Works (unrep., MT Ref 3/82) involving compensation for 
the MTR line, the value of the development permitted under the imposed restrictions and the 
additional construction costs necessary to facilitate the original development were deducted 
from the value of the original development: Cruden (n 16 above), p 396.
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An incentive perspective of the law examines the incentives created 
by a given legal regime on the relevant actors to analyse whether the 
relevant actors would engage in a socially desirable course of action. 
Although the incentive perspective assumes that the relevant actors 
are rational, the incentive calculus should not be restricted to those of a 
monetary nature.96 In the realm of public law, in which the government 
is a major player in the formulation and implementation of policies, the 
incentive perspective is particularly valuable because it examines the 
pressures and inducements that shape government actions.
A. Constraints on Government Actors
The exercise of regulatory powers is an inherent function of the 
government, particularly in the current regulatory state.97 The exercise 
of regulatory powers is subject to the basic expectations and requirements 
that it should only be exercised to promote the general social welfare. 
This expectation and requirement thus became an important justifi cation 
for the denial of compensation to private individuals who suffered losses 
under the regulatory regime.98 Except in the narrowly defi ned categories 
of unconstitutional regulatory takings,99 costs imposed by regulations 
are the expected and legitimate burdens that should be borne by private 
entities for the general benefi t of society.
Conversely, the incentive perspective treats government offi cials as it 
treats other private individuals. Government offi cials are affected by their 
own self-interest and other factors that render them unable to actively 
and single-mindedly pursue the public interest during the performance of 
regulatory functions.100 This scepticism towards the political process gives rise 
to fairness arguments to justify compensation for regulatory takings. Injustice 
may occur when a lack of compensation for affected private individuals means 
96 Stephen J Spurr, Economic Foundations of Law (Routledge, 2nd ed, 2010) 2–4 (“For cost is a very 
broad idea in economics: depending on the situation, the cost of a given action may include 
money, time, emotional stress, discomfort, the risk of physical injury or criminal prosecution, or 
other undesirable consequences”).
97 David J Barron and Todd D Rakoff, “In Defense of Big Waiver” (2013) 113 Colum. L. Rev. 265, 
266–267.
98 Mildred E Warner, “Regulatory Takings and Free Trade Agreements: Implications for Planners” 
(2009) 41 Urb. Law. 427, 428; Christopher Serkin, “The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just 
Compensation for Regulatory Takings” (2005) 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 677, 713–714; James Audley 
McLaughlin, “Majoritarian Theft in the Regulatory State: What’s A Takings Clause For?” 
(1995) 19 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 161, 190–192.
99 See Above Part III.C.
100 Paul Niemann and Perry Shapiro, “Compensation for Taking When Both Equity and Effi ciency 
Matter” in Benson (n 1 above), p 55; John A Rogovin and Rodger D Citron, “Lessons from the 
Nextwave Saga: The Federal Communications Commission, the Courts and the Use of Market 
Forms to Perform Public Functions” (2005) 57 Admin. L. Rev. 687, 695.
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that they are required to bear the entire cost of the regulatory actions.101 In 
particular, there is concern that the powers of the government will be abused 
to the detriment of vulnerable minorities.102 The common constitutional 
requirement of compensation for physical takings (eminent domain) refl ects 
such counter-majoritarian protection of minorities.103
Another strain of argument from this incentive perspective addresses 
the effi ciency of government actions. While taking a less negative view of 
the political process, this argument focuses on the risks of the government 
making socially ineffi cient decisions when it is not required to take into 
account the costs of those decisions. The constraints of information costs 
impede even a politically responsive government in allocating resources 
effectively for the public interest.104 Within the context of regulatory 
takings, providing compensation serves as an important constraint 
on government by compelling it to confront the costs and benefi ts of 
government actions. 105 Undercompensation (or worse, no compensation) 
may result in ineffi cient government actions because the full social costs 
of the government actions are not internalised.106 The government will 
be induced to impose excessive regulatory burdens instead of engaging 
socially cheaper alternatives that may cost the government more.107
Both arguments resonate in the Ho Tung Gardens saga. Although the 
undeniable historical signifi cance Ho Tung Gardens arguably renders its 
preservation a socially benefi cial endeavour,108 a legal regime that prohibits 
development without providing compensation109 imposes the entire cost 
101 Armstrong v United States, 364 US 40 (1960); Niemann and Shapiro (n 100 above), p 57; Mark 
Fenster, ‘The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process of Constitutional Property 
Rights’ (2007) 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 667, 694–698.
102 Stelle Garnett, ‘The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain’ (2006) 105 Mich. L. 
Rev. 101, 120; Serkin (n 98 above), p 718; Saul Levmore, “Just Compensation and Just Politics” 
(1990) 22 Conn. L. Rev. 285, 309.
103 Jonathan H Adler, ‘The Adverse Environmental Consequences of Uncompensated Land-Use 
Controls’ in Benson (n 1 above), pp 187, 196; Fenster (n 101 above), pp 699–702; McLaughlin 
(n 98 above), p 172.
104 Brown and Stroup (n 1 above), p 224.
105 Fenster (n 101 above), pp 707–709; Serkin (n 98 above), pp 706–707.
106 Michael Heller and Rick Hills, “Land Assembly Districts” (2008) 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1465, 
1481; Steven J Eagle, “Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence” 
[2007] B.Y.U.L. Rev. 899, 926; Charles E Cohen, “Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New 
London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings” (2006) 29 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 491, 541–542.
107 Adler (n 103 above), pp 196–197; Serkin (n 98 above), pp 708–709; Eagle (n 3 above), p 188.
108 For a discussion of the social value of heritage, see Salla (n 2 above), pp 1–4; Ross (n 1 above), 
pp 1–9.
109 The US literature clearly identifi ed the requirement of due process, in particular notice and 
the right of hearing, given the restrictions imposed on the affected owners’ properties, but are 
more ambiguous as to the constitutional necessity of compensation: Norman Tyler, Historic 
Preservation: An Introduction to Its History, Principles, and Practice 78–81 (W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2000); Kass, LaBelee and Hansell (n 4 above), pp 198–200 and 209–219.
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of the socially benefi cial endeavour onto the individual property owner. 
Although the owner of a large mansion in an exclusive residential 
district does not present the stereotypical image of an oppressed minority, 
a growing populist movement in favour of heritage conservation is not 
always sensitive to the associated costs.110 In such circumstances, even 
providing public consultation111 or other forms of democratic checks112 are 
of limited protection to the property owner because the public in general 
would be broadly supportive of the public goods of historical preservation, 
but relatively indifferent to the private costs of development restrictions. 
In the Ho Tung Gardens saga, the erroneous assumption of compensation 
helped constrain an excessive use of the potentially far-reaching power of 
monument declaration.
Moreover, this erroneous assumption positively framed the 
government responses and public discourse surrounding the preservation 
of Hong Kong’s historical heritage. The issue became not simply whether 
the site is of historical signifi cance and value, but whether it is worth 
the considerable compensation that the government must pay as 
compensation for lost development rights. This forces government actors 
and public commentators to confront the real substantial costs associated 
with legislative and executive initiatives to preserve historical buildings. 
This facilitates dialogue and debate beyond the one-sided issue about the 
effi cacy of historical preservation measures and onto the more critical 
question of the social effi ciency of government actions.
B. Perverse Incentives for Property Owners
Aside from the important constraints on government actors to ensure 
fairness and effi ciency, adequate compensations for regulatory takings is 
necessary to create incentives for property owners to invest in and manage 
their property. When confronted with a signifi cant risk of uncompensated 
regulatory burdens, property owners are likely to underinvest in their 
property for fear of losing their investment in a government regulatory 
110 For example, Philip Bowring, “Identity Sold for a Quick Profi t”, South China Morning Post, 18 
March 2012, p 16 (considering the claims of compensation by owners Ho Tung Gardens as 
“evidence of greed” and opining that “inheritors of historic buildings are expected to be their 
guardians”); Michael Chugani, “Public Eye”, South China Morning Post, 26 October 2011, p 2 
(“Other tycoons before her have plundered our heritage for profi t”).
111 One example of incorporating public consultation in land administration is the drawing up of 
zoning plans under the Town Planning Ordinance: Cruden (n 16 above), pp 555–562.
112 A public consultation on whether the monument declaration for Ho Tung Gardens should 
proceed was proposed but not carried out eventually: “Weighing the Cost of Saving the Past”, 
South China Morning Post, 17 October 2011, p 14.
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action.113 Such risks will also reduce the value of property in general 
because potential buyers will discount the price of the property by the risk 
of value-diminishing government regulatory actions,114 which actually 
helps constrain the government’s decision in Hong Kong. The dominance 
of land sales and other land-associated revenue as a source of government 
revenue in Hong Kong115 results in an unwillingness of the government 
to adopt measures that might otherwise erode land and property values.116
In the particular context of the Ordinance, the primary concern is that 
inadequate compensation creates a perverse incentive for the property 
owner that harms the legislative and policy objectives of historical 
conservation. Without adequate compensation, a monument declaration 
might impose huge fi nancial losses to the affected property owner. 
However, as opposed to general regulatory settings, the property owner 
can unilaterally reduce the risk of the regulatory burden imposed by the 
Ordinance. Although a property owner can do little to avoid a fi nancially 
damaging downzoning during a re-zoning exercise,117 a property owner can 
avoid having property declared a monument by demolishing or otherwise 
developing any property that may be considered of historical signifi cance. 
This risk of pre-emptive destruction was demonstrated during a preservation 
effort of the King Yin Lei mansion. After a concerted community effort 
in 2004 successfully pressured the owner to cancel the auction of the 
mansion,118 the owner began demolishing the building (unannounced) 
in 2007 and was only stopped by a proposed monument declaration.119 
Such actions, although logical from the incentive perspective of property 
owners, severely undermine the legislative objectives of the Ordinance.
The perverse incentive placed on property owners to destroy the 
things that the legislation intends to protect applies to other forms 
of regulations that unilaterally impose restrictions on private property. 
113 Serkin (n 98 above), p 715. While the takings literature identifi es the risk of over-compensation 
where market value for the property is claimable, that risk appears to be small when compared 
to ineffi ciencies of under-compensation: Adler (n 103 above), p 188.
114 Brown and Stroup (n 1 above), p 222; Lawrence Blume, “Compensation for Takings: An 
Economic Analysis” (1984) 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569, 584–590.
115 Lawrence WC Lai, “A Model of Planning by Contract: Integrating Comprehensive State 
Planning, Freedom of Contract, Public Participation and Fidelity” (2010) 81(6) The Town 
Planning Review 647, 665; CY Jim, “Planning Strategies to Overcome Constraints on Greenspace 
Provision in Urban Hong Kong” (2002) 73(2) The Town Planning Review 127, 146.
116 Jim (n 115 above), p 146.
117 Indeed, Fine Tower Associates Ltd v Town Planning Board provides an example of cruel irony 
where the down-zoning was prompted by the application of up-zoning by the affected owners: 
Fine Tower Associates Ltd v Town Planning Board (n 74 above), pp 557–558.
118 Peggy Sito and Chloe Lai, “Historic House Taken off the Market”, South China Morning Post, 23 
June 2004, p 1.
119 Martin Wong and Dennis Chong, “Minister Call Times on Wreckers”, South China Morning 
Post, 15 September 2007, p 1.
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In the context of environmental regulations, various empirical studies 
in the US have demonstrated that the risks of uncompensated land-use 
restrictions to protect endangered species and other natural heritages 
induce pre-emptive destruction of those natural heritages.120 This confi rms 
the numerous anecdotal accounts in which property owners actively 
destroyed habitats that were suitable for endangered species for fear of the 
fi nancially damaging restrictions imposed under the U.S.’s Endangered 
Species Act.121
Of course, there are other property owners who would voluntarily 
preserve their historical buildings.122 However, these owners are not the 
real concern of the Ordinance. Property owners who place economic 
value over historical preservation have always been the target of historical 
preservation laws. For example, the impetus of the UK legislative 
amendment to strengthen the legal powers for historical preservation in 
1913 was the Tattershall Castle scandal, which involved an American 
syndicate of speculators purchasing a fi ve-hundred-year-old castle and 
selling off individual mantelpieces to art dealers for maximum profi t.123 
The perverse incentive to actively destroy or redevelop old buildings 
under a legal regime that does not award adequate compensation will be 
particularly strong for such property owners.
C.  The (Illogical) Distinction between Money and In-Kind 
Compensation
In addition to the unarticulated and unresolved basis of compensation 
assessment, the Ho Tung Gardens also highlighted a less conspicuous but 
nevertheless important issue in the Ordinance, ie the checks and balances 
on the use of public resources in conservation. The approval of the Chief 
Executive is required whenever compensation is to be paid out to private 
entities, whether as compensation for fi nancial losses resulting from 
monument declaration,124 reimbursement of maintenance, preservation 
or restoration work on the monument125 or reward for discovering 
120 Adler (n 103 above), pp 191–194 (discussing the various studies).
121 Ibid., pp 189–190.
122 Of the seven private properties that were declared as monuments since 2008, no ostensible 
compensation in any forms was needed for six of them. The six are Maryknoll Convent 
School, Residence of Ip Ting Sz, Yan Tun Kong Study Hall at Ping Shan of Yuen Long, Tung 
Wah Museum, Man Mo Temple on Hollywood Road and Tang Kwong U Ancestral Hall at 
Kam Tin of Yuen Long: Offi cial Records of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 
23 November 2011, 2335.
123 Sax (n 73 above), p 1566.
124 Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance (Cap 53) ss 8 and 9.
125 Ibid., s 7.
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antiquities.126 In addition, s 21 provides that monetary compensation 
under the Ordinance is to be paid for by funds provided by the Legislative 
Council.
This legal regime draws a distinction between compensation paid out in 
cash and compensation in kind. Only the former is subject to the mandatory 
legislative oversight of budgetary control. In-kind compensation, whether 
in the form of land exchange, benefi cial re-zoning or relaxation of plot 
ratios, is not subject to legislative approval because it does not involve 
payment of public funds. This discrepancy was raised in the legislative 
debate by the chairman of the subcommittee responsible for the Ho Tung 
Gardens preservation127 and elicited a response from the Secretary that, 
although the Legislative Council does not approve compensation for 
which there is no payment of cash, other approval bodies are involved 
for other forms of compensation. For example, re-zoning and increasing 
plot ratios requires the approval of the Town Planning Board, whereas the 
relevant District Councils are consulted in the cases of land exchange.128
The requirements for obtaining the approval of these other regulatory 
bodies are of limited value as checks and balances because they are all 
part of the executive branch. In fact, the negotiation process of the Ho 
Tung Gardens reveals the wide array of in-kind compensation offered to 
the property owner, including a land swap of an adjacent site that was 
zoned as a green belt and redesigning the building plan. There are no 
suggestions or reports of any intra-bureaucratic standoffs between the 
different regulatory bodies and the Secretary in her role to preserve Ho 
Tung Gardens. Indeed, the offering of in-kind compensation is clearly 
the preferred mode of compensation, at least in the realm of historical 
preservation. In the earlier high-profi le conservation effort of the King 
Yin Lei mansion, the monument declaration was secured by offering an 
adjacent site that was originally zoned as a green belt.129 In the case of 
Haw Par Mansion, the historic mansion and garden were transferred to 
the government in exchange for a plot ratio of quantity equal to the fl oor 
area of the transferred property.130
This discrepancy is not merely legal; it extends to public and political 
discourse. Statements by government offi cials reveal an aversion to using 
public funds to preserve historic buildings and a preference for achieving 
preservation without spending cash. For example, although the Secretary 
126 Ibid., s 11(4).
127 Offi cial Records of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 16 March 2011, 7962–
7965.
128 Ibid., p 7973.
129 Lung (n 16 above), p 137; Ng (n 41 above); Cruden (n 16 above), p 39.
130 Lung (n 16 above), p 136.
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did correctly observe that “public resources will be committed” whenever 
public money or land exchange is utilised for compensation,131 she 
nevertheless took pains to emphasise during the legislative debate that 
“[n]o public money was involved” in resolving a prior preservation effort 
of King Yin Lei.132 This was echoed by her earlier statements against the 
use of “hard cash” to purchase historical buildings in private ownership.133 
Indeed, she observed that other countries “seldom opted for spending 
public money on compensation to undertake heritage preservation”.134 
Similarly, although local academic David Lung recognised that the 
government was in fact “buying back” ownership of the historic properties 
for conservation efforts, he also considered it signifi cant that public 
revenue was not spent.135
However, there is no distinction between monetary compensation 
and in-kind compensation from the incentive perspective. Both are 
economically valuable to the recipients and economically costly to the 
providers. The economic value to the recipients is obvious; otherwise, 
property owners affected by monument declaration would not have agreed 
to forgo profi table development. The recipients of in-kind compensation 
that involves the transfer of physical property (such as a land exchange) 
can easily cash out the monetary value of these in-kind compensations. 
A similar principle applies to upzoning, which is the relaxation of plot 
ratios and other benefi cial regulatory actions offered as compensation. 
There is again no fundamental distinction between “property” and 
“regulation” in terms of the fi nancial impact on recipients,136 and it is 
not uncommon for the enhancement of property values that arises from 
favourable planning/zoning decisions to dwarf the entire value of the land 
prior to such decision.137
In-kind compensation is also costly to the provider even if there is no 
ostensible payment of monies. At fi rst glance, an in-kind compensation 
that involves a land exchange, such as a green belt, seems to successfully 
131 Offi cial Records of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 16 March 2011, 7972.
132 Offi cial Records of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 23 November 2011, 2335.
133 Offi cial Records of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 9 November 2011, 1742–
1743.
134 Offi cial Records of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 16 March 2011, 7973.
135 Lung (n 16 above), p 137 (“The public was willing to give up a piece of green belt land in 
exchange for a historic complex without spending public revenue. This example can be 
considered as the fi rst of its kind success achieved in protecting historic buildings in private 
ownership”).
136 Eagle (n 3 above), p 332.
137 Tom Allen, “Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative 
View” in Robin Paul Malloy (ed), Private Property, Community Development, and Eminent Domain 
(Ashgate, 2008) 75, 95 (£7000 per hectare mixed use agricultural land versus £ 2.6 million per 
hectare of residential “bulk” land).
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secure historical preservation without any real public expenditure. 
However, this in-kind compensation decreases public assets (in this case, 
the valuable resource of land in land-scarce Hong Kong). In addition, the 
public coffers will suffer even more if the revenue that could be derived 
from the public auction of that land is larger than the legally payable 
compensation.
This critique applies with identical force to benefi cial regulatory 
actions that do not involve the transfer of any physical property to the 
recipients. Given the real economic benefi ts of the benefi cial regulations 
to the recipients, it is not surprising that they can be monetised by the 
government. In Hong Kong, there is an established practice of collecting 
a premium for lease modifi cations designed to take advantage of an 
upzoning of the area.138 This practice allows the government to recoup 
the enhancement of economic value arising from the change in zoning. 
Thus, using benefi cial regulations as a form of in-kind compensation 
involves real opportunity costs of monetising those regulations. Moreover, 
regulatory actions often inevitably affect the community at large. When 
regulatory actions are meant to serve as compensation to private owners, 
the public as a whole suffers from this departure from the original purpose 
of these regulations. For example, land originally zoned as green belt is 
commonly offered in a land exchange to secure monument declaration. 
The necessary change in zoning reduces the available greenery and other 
important environmental benefi ts of green-belt zoning.139
Hence, the dichotomy between monetary compensation and in-kind 
compensation that shapes the disparity in checks and balances under 
the legal regime and permeates the public and political discourse is an 
artifi cial dichotomy. This can give rise to ineffi ciencies and injustices 
from overcompensation. Although the inclusion of the potential hefty 
compensation in the public discourse about historical preservation is 
integral to achieving a socially effi cient outcome, the lack of emphasis 
paid to non-monetary compensation creates perverse incentives for the 
government to offer excessively in-kind compensation (whether in the 
form of land exchange or benefi cial land-use regulatory changes) to 
secure the property owner’s consent to monument declaration. With 
such overcompensation, the government avoids the owner’s claim for 
monetary compensation while relieving itself of the potential political 
backlash from a failing historical conservation programme. The property 
138 Lai (n 115 above), p 665; Roger Nissim, Land Administration and Practice in Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong University Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 69–75.
139 Jim (n 115 above), p 128.
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owner is also more likely to accept this generous in-kind compensation. 
However, the public coffers and the public at large suffer whenever such 
overcompensation is paid out.
Conversely, there is the risk of undercompensation whenever monetary 
compensation is payable, as arguably demonstrated by the example of Ho 
Tung Gardens. Although the government clearly recognised the historical 
value of Ho Tung Gardens, the monument declaration was derailed simply 
because of the aversion to paying cash. What is tellingly unfortunate is 
that this result was not caused by a lack of economic resources or lack of 
commitment to utilise those resources for compensation; on the contrary, 
the government is willing to offer substantial in-kind compensation (such 
as exchanging land of equal value) to secure historical preservation. The 
fact that the affected owner is not interested in such in-kind compensation 
should not, in theory, be an obstacle because the government can simply 
monetise the in-kind compensation (eg auction off the land that is 
proposed for land exchange) to pay the owner in cash. However, there 
is strong incentive in the executive branch to avoid this course of action 
because, once monetised, the revenue is subject to legislative approval 
(and greater public scrutiny),140 whereas the use of land (including for 
exchange) or regulatory actions is entirely within the domain of the 
executive branch.141
D. Fiscal Pressure
Imposing the fi scal burden onto the government forces it to confront 
the economic consequences of its actions, but the approach is not 
without problems. For instance, conservation efforts are likely to be 
derailed in times of economic constraints.142 This is particularly so within 
the context of Hong Kong, which is required under the Basic Law to 
maintain low-tax policies and limited fi scal defi cit.143 The requirement 
of substantial compensation may compel the government to under-
perform in its conservation efforts. The government may avoid making 
a monument declaration unless it is completely certain of the historical 
signifi cance of a monument. This is not necessarily a problem in other 
regulatory settings because the government should always be careful not 
140 Richard Cullen et al., “Fiscal Policy and Financial System” in Chan and Lim (n 14 above), pp 
321, 326–328 (discussing the Legislative Council role in budget and fi scal control).
141 Nissim (n 138 above), pp 55–68 (discussing the functions and powers of the Lands Department – 
the government executive department responsible for land administration).
142 Halfi n (n 71 above), p 15 (criticizing the UK experience).
143 Cullen (n 140 above), p 340.
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to unduly burden private property rights. Moreover, the government can 
always reverse course at a later date with better evidence of the need of 
regulatory intervention. However, the particular problem with historical 
conservation is that there is no opportunity to reverse course once the 
property is demolished and/or redeveloped.
The problem of fi scal pressure is further aggravated by the fact that 
heritage conservation is considered in the economics literature as a 
luxury and positional good – demand for this type of good increases as 
wealth grows.144 Thus, a dwindling of the state coffers (perhaps because of 
a fi nancial downturn) will both increase the tension between historical 
preservation and other government expenditures and decrease the public 
demand for historical preservation in relation to other policy matters.
V. What the Law Should Be
The analysis from the incentive perspective in the previous section 
highlights the imperative for reform in Hong Kong. This part outlines 
a set of reform guidelines by drawing from the parallel experience in 
the UK. The UK legal regime provides a useful comparative case study 
for two reasons. First, although the UK legal regime was not expressly 
mentioned during the legislative debate in Hong Kong, the Ordinance 
broadly resembles the framework of the fl agship legislation on historical 
preservation in the UK – the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological 
Areas Act 1979.145 This is not surprising because Hong Kong was a British 
colony when the Ordinance was enacted and continues to be strongly 
infl uenced by the English common law.146 Second, the relevant UK legal 
regime has been in force for a much greater period of time, with several 
legislative reforms and developed case law since its inception in the late 
nineteenth century. Any reform proposals in Hong Kong should learn 
from the UK experience to avoid similar pitfalls.
A. Comparative Perspective: the U.K.
1. General legal framework
There are two primary legal tools for historical preservation in the UK. The 
fi rst, the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act, was enacted 
144 Brown and Stroup (n 1 above), pp 211–212.
145 Chapter 46 (1979) (UK).
146 Johannes Chan, “The Judiciary” in Chan and Lim (n 14 above), p 289.
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in 1979147 to consolidate existing laws, such as the Historic Buildings 
and Ancient Monuments Act of 1953148 and the Town and Country 
Planning (Amendment) Act of 1972.149 The Ancient Monuments and 
Archaeological Areas Act is the most relevant legal tool for our inquiry 
because, similar to its Hong Kong counterpart, the preservation of historical 
buildings under this legislation is achieved through the scheduling (ie 
declaration) of monuments.150 A “scheduled monument consent” from 
the responsible regulatory authority (ie the Secretary of State) is required 
for any alteration or demolition work proposed to be undertaken on a 
scheduled monument,151 with compensation payable for refusal.152
The other relevant legislation is the Planning (Listed Buildings and 
Conservation Areas) Act 1990153, which maintains a schedule of “listed 
buildings”. The designation of a “listed building” imposes a duty on the 
relevant planning authorities to consider the architectural or historic 
interests of the “listed building” during the determination of planning 
permissions.154 A listed building consent is also required from the relevant 
local planning authorities for any work undertaken on the premises.155 
The difference between a “listed building” and a “scheduled monument” 
is mainly one of degree. Refl ecting the lower threshold of historical 
signifi cance that will trigger a “listing” compared to a “scheduling”, 
the legal protection afforded to a “listed building” is less than that of 
a “scheduled monument”.156 The mere act of listing does not trigger a 
statutory presumption in favour of preservation, and it is up to the local 
planning authorities in their exercise of their planning function157 to 
147 For a discussion of the UK historical conservation law from the historical perspective, see 
generally Sax (n 73 above). For a discussion of the framework of the Ancient Monuments 
and Archaeological Areas Act 1979, see Halfi n (n 71 above), pp 10–13. For a discussion about 
overall historic preservation regime in UK, see Salla (n 2 above), pp 111–139.
148 Chapter 49 (1953) (UK).
149 Chapter 42 (1972) (U.K.).
150 Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 (Ch 46) s 1.
151 Ibid., s 2.
152 Ibid., ss 7 – 8.
153 Chapter 9 (1990) (UK).
154 Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 (Ch 9) s 66.
155 Ibid., ss 7 – 8.
156 For a discussion of the consequences of listing, see Salla (n 2 above), pp 123–127; Roger W 
Suddards et al., Listed Buildings: The Law and Practice of Historic Buildings, Ancient Monuments, 
and Conservation Areas (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed, 1996) 58–64; Mnynors (n 92 above), 
pp 47–50.
157 This planning function involves the balancing of various social and economic factors 
associated with the planning of the entire function, with heritage conservation merely a factor 
of consideration, albeit an important one nonetheless: Suddards (n 156 above), pp 106–180 
(discussing the criteria for listed building consent).
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decide whether a listed building consent will be issued.158 The fi nancial 
impact of “listing” is also more ambivalent,159 and no compensation is 
provided for the refusal of planning permissions.160
2. The compensation provision
Section 7 of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 
contains the right of compensation for “loss or damage” arising from “the 
refusal, or the granting subject to conditions, of a scheduled monument 
consent”. Section 7 expressly sets forth in some detail the different 
calculations of compensation in the various scenarios. In particular, 
s 7(6) provides that loss or damage includes “depreciation of the value 
of an interest in land”, calculated under the assumption that any refusal 
or conditions imposed would continue to be imposed for any subsequent 
applications for works of a similar nature. This is an important clarifi cation 
about the basis of compensation because it resolves the ambiguity of 
whether the court must assess and take into account the likelihood of 
the refusal (or conditions imposed) being lifted in the future. Conversely, 
s 7(4) provides that there is no compensation if the work involves total 
or partial demolition of the monument161 and if the planning permission 
(other than by a general development order)162 for the demolition 
work had not been granted before the monument was scheduled as a 
monument.163
A notable feature of the UK legislation is the provision of compensation 
recovery in the event of the reversal of the refusal to grant consent for 
development work on the scheduled monument.164 This serves to balance 
the otherwise generous assumption under s 7(6) that future application 
for consent to undertake the development work would be refused. The 
owner of the scheduled monument would not be undeservingly enriched 
if the owner claimed compensation for refusal but then subsequently 
managed to obtain consent, perhaps because of a change in government 
or conservation policy.
158 Mnynors (n 92 above), p 47.
159 Ibid., p 50 (“In other cases listing may be advantageous, as is shown by the number of estate 
agents’ particulars which make a feature of it”).
160 Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 (Ch 9) s 27; Mnynors (n 92 
above), p 250. There is a right to force the local authority to purchase the property in the 
narrow grounds that there is no longer any reasonable benefi cial uses because of the refusal of 
permission: Suddards (n 156 above), pp 200–202; Mnynors (n 92 above), pp 252–254. However, 
this right merely refl ects well-established doctrine of regulatory takings – compensation is only 
payable where all economic use/value is destroyed by the regulation: above Part III.C.
161 Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 (Ch 46) s 7(4).
162 A general development order is “a development order made as a general order applicable 
(subject to such exceptions as may be specifi ed therein) to all land”: ibid., s 7(7).
163 Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 (Ch 46), s 7(2)(a).
164 Ibid., s 8.
HKLJ3-4 Chen Jianlin-Ho Tung gardens(17102013).indd   862 12/14/13   7:24 PM
Vol 43 Part 3 Ho Tung Gardens Saga and the Basis of Compensation 863
3. Application
In the only case that assessed the compensation provision of the 1979 
act,165 the Scottish Lands Tribunal in Currie’s Executors v Secretary of State 
for Scotland166 set the date of assessment for loss as the date of the refusal 
of the consent. More signifi cantly, any losses in property value caused by 
policy changes after the monument declaration but prior to the date of 
refusal are not claimable.167 This is the case even if the policy changes – 
although effected independently by a different regulatory department – 
were made with the intention to protect scheduled monuments.168 
This decision echoed the earlier decision of Hoveringham Gravels Ltd v 
Secretary of State for the Environment,169 which applied the more simplifi ed 
compensation provision (s 12) of the predecessor legislation, the 
Historic Buildings and Ancient Monuments Act of 1953. The court in 
Hoveringham Gravels Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment found 
that no compensation is payable because planning permissions under the 
Town and Country Planning Act of 1971 would not be granted for the 
proposed development that is also the subject matter of the scheduled 
consent. This is the case even if the refusal of planning permission is 
related to possible harm to an ancient monument.170
Although the assessment of compensation is not frequently litigated, 
the compensation payable for scheduling a monument remains an integral 
part of the government’s decision-making process. One high-profi le event 
under this scheme was the discovery of the Shakespearean Rose Theatre 
in 1989. Notwithstanding the recognised national importance of the site, 
the Secretary of State (the relevant government authority for monument 
scheduling) decided against scheduling. One of the explicit reasons 
proffered was the risk of substantial compensation that would become 
payable to the developer because a planning permission had previously 
been granted for development of the site.171
165 Michael Ross opined that the claims in compensation only arise “[i]n certain rather unusual 
circumstances”: Ross (n 1 above), p 149.
166 1992 SLT (Lands Tr) 69.
167 Ibid.,p 72.
168 In Currie’s Executors v Secretary of State for Scotland, no compensation was awarded because the 
value of the intended use by the owner (forestry) had already been severely reduced when the 
Forestry Commission decided to stop giving forestry grants to reforestation efforts on ancient 
monuments. For a critical analysis of this decision, see Jeremy Rowan-Robinson, “Compensation 
for Safeguarding Archaeological Remains” (1992) 37 Scottish Planning Law & Practice 81.
169 [1975] QB 754.
170 Ibid., p 764–762. For a discussion of the case, see Cruden (n 16 above), p 42; Suddards (n 156 
above), pp 301–302.
171 A judicial review was brought against the government decision, but was dismissed on account 
of the wide discretion afforded to the Secretary of State under the statute. The monument was 
nevertheless scheduled in 1992. For an account of the incident, see Suddards (n 156 above), 
pp 303–304.
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B. Reform Guidelines
The discussion above highlights three important considerations that 
should inform a well-designed compensation scheme for historical 
preservation.
1. Adequacy of compensation
Adequate compensation is important because it ensures that a more 
comprehensive and accurate assessment of the costs of historical 
preservation is taken into account during the processes of public debate 
and government decision making. Moreover, adequate compensation 
mitigates the perverse incentives of property owners to destroy the 
historical signifi cance of their property before far-reaching restrictions of 
monument declaration are placed on it.
Of course, the adequacy of such compensation is subject to intense 
controversies. The UK legislation focuses on the depreciation in land 
value caused by restrictions on development.172 A similar basis is adopted 
in Hong Kong for the development restrictions imposed during the 
construction of the Mass Transit Railway or for nature preservation.173 
Notwithstanding the inevitable debate as to the appropriate valuation 
method,174 compensation for the depreciation in land value is conceptually 
sound because it captures the objective economic losses suffered by the 
property owner. Moreover, although awarding fair market value in eminent 
domain cases has not prevented criticisms of undercompensation,175 
many of these critiques are not applicable to the restrictions associated 
with monument declaration. For example, sentimental attachment to a 
property that may result in the subjective value of the property being 
higher than fair market value176 will not be destroyed under the monument 
declaration (in fact, it will be better protected). Similarly, monument 
declaration will only generate limited relocation and replacement costs – 
signifi cant costs that are not refl ected in fair market value177 – because 
property owners remain entitled to live and use the premises without 
disturbance.
172 See above Part V.A.
173 See above Part III.A.
174 See Cruden (n 16 above), pp 593–629 (discussing the various valuation methods utilized in 
Hong Kong for land administration cases). See generally Wallace Kaufman, “How Fair is Market 
Value?” in Benson (n 1 above), p 77 (discussing the various potential distortions in the valuation 
process that may result in either under or over compensation).
175 James J Kelly, Jr., ‘“We Shall Not be Moved’: Urban Communities, Eminent Domain and the 
Socioeconomics of Just Compensation” (2006) 80 St. John’s L. Rev. 923, 940; Eagle (n 3 above), 
pp 189–190.
176 Garnett (n 102 above), p 107; Eagle (n 106 above), p 926.
177 Garnett (n 102 above), p 106; Cohen (n 106 above), p 538.
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There is a shortcoming in the current UK regime that must be remedied 
to avoid undercompensation. The otherwise adequate compensation 
provided for in the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act is 
subject to two important qualifi cations. First, a prior planning permission 
must be in place before compensation for refusal of scheduled consent 
may be claimed. This requirement is likely to induce a property owner 
to ensure that a planning permission for maximum development is in 
place for the property at all times to safeguard the right of compensation. 
Applying for planning permission is a waste of private and public resources 
when it is made for the purpose of compensation rather than for genuine 
development.
More problematic is the second qualifi cation, in which the reduction 
in land value caused by other regulatory schemes would be excluded from 
compensation even if the regulatory burdens were advanced for purposes of 
heritage conservation. Historical value will effectively continue to increase 
the risk of fi nancially disastrous regulatory burdens that would not be 
compensated. Adequacy of compensation must ensure that governmental 
authority cannot circumvent the compensation provision by utilising other 
legislative or regulatory schemes that do not provide for compensation.178 
This is not a problem for building permission in Hong Kong because the 
assessment by the Building Department is restricted to structural safety 
issues and compliance with zoning plans.179 However, it is a problem 
regarding zoning under Town Planning Ordinance (Cap 131) because 
the regulatory mandate is broadly worded to include the “promotion of 
the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the community”.180 
Indeed, there is judicial recognition that the Town Planning Board can take 
into account the presence of historical sites in formulating development 
restrictions and other zoning matters.181 As no compensation is payable 
for downzoning,182 there is a possibility that the government will game the 
system by fi rst downzoning the property before a monument declaration. 
To preserve adequacy of compensation as a safeguard against pre-emptive 
destruction, it will be important to include fi nancial losses that arise from 
other regulatory actions motivated by heritage conservation.
178 Cf, Westminster Bank Ltd v Beverley Borough Council [1971] AC 508 (HL) (holding that 
when there are two alternative courses open to a public authority – one of which gives rise to 
compensation and the other does not – the authority is entitled to adopt the one which does not 
give rise to compensation)
179 Buildings Ordinance(Cap 123) s 16. For a discussion of the relevant case law, see Cruden (n 16 
above), pp 48–54.
180 Town Planning Ordinance (Cap 131) s 3.
181 Oriental Generation Ltd v Town Planning Board (n 84 above), [7] (they include one grade 1 listed 
building and a grade 3 listed building).
182 See above Part III.C.
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In any event, the basis of the compensation should be clearly delineated 
to ensure transparency. Although the erroneous assumption of hefty 
compensation in the Ho Tung Gardens saga promoted the proper framing 
of the issue in public discourse, the lack of an expressly articulated method 
of compensation assumption resulted in a wide range of compensation 
amounts being bandied about. Moreover, these fi gures are often incorrect 
even if the legal basis were deemed to be the diminution of property value. 
As noted above, the substantial construction costs and the value of the 
existing property should be deducted from the HK$3 billion price tag of 
the redevelopment. This renders the headline in the local English press – 
“Taxpayers Face HK$3b Bill for Mansion” – arguably misleading.183 Indeed, 
the compensation fi gure in the press report was raised to HK$7 billion 
simply after the owner declared it.184 This ambiguity was not clarifi ed in 
any way by the public stance of the government that purportedly did 
not undertake an assessment of the monetary compensation payable.185 
Certainty in assessing compensation will ensure that neither the public 
discourse nor the government decision-making process is distorted by 
either overcompensation or undercompensation.
2.  No distinction between in-kind compensation and 
monetary compensation
The compensation scheme should avoid making the distinction between 
in-kind compensation and monetary compensation. The fact that in-
kind compensation does not necessarily involve an explicit expenditure 
of public funds neither reduces the need for checks and balances nor the 
consideration of public fi nances. In particular, the in-kind compensations 
typically used by the Hong Kong government as “economic incentives” 
for historical preservation are all capable of monetary quantifi cation.
This does not imply that in-kind compensation should be prohibited. 
There are circumstances in which in-kind compensation is more effi cient. 
For example, if compensation can only be paid in monetary terms, 
transaction costs must be incurred to monetise the in-kind compensation 
(eg public auction to sell the land used for land exchange) before transfer 
to the affected property owners. Insofar as such monetisation would not 
have occurred but for the compensation payable under the monument 
declaration, these transaction costs are additional deadweight costs 
183 Ng (n 47 above).
184 Joyce Ng, “Preservation More Than a Matter of Trust”, South China Morning Post, 22 January 
2012, p 4.
185 Offi cial Records of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), 23 November 2011, 
2334–2335. No reason was offered for the failure to undertake the assessment, despite the real 
likelihood that negotiation would not succeed given the refusal of the previous offers of in-kind 
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that benefi t neither the government nor the property owners. In-kind 
compensation may also be of particular value to the affected property 
owner. There may be some particular subjective preference regarding the 
location of the premise that would not be captured by a general assessment 
of the market value of the property.186 A land exchange involving property 
from an adjacent site might be particularly valuable to the owner without 
increasing the burden on the government. Similarly, the relaxation of 
plot ratios and other benefi cial zoning may provide special value to a 
particular development project undertaken by the affected owners, 
perhaps because of a unique architectural or development concept, that 
will not be refl ected if “sold” to other property owners. There is no reason 
to bind the government’s compensation options in such circumstances. 
This article simply argues that similar approval mechanisms should be 
adopted for both in-kind and monetary compensation.
3. Regular fi nancial commitment
Given that historical preservation is not a public benefi t that can be readily 
quantifi able187 and is a positional good that responds adversely to a reduction 
in spending power,188 a robust historical preservation compensation scheme 
must be resistant to cyclic fi scal pressure. The current practice of seeking 
approval for legislative funding in an ad hoc manner is not desirable. 
A regular fi nancial commitment to a fund for historical preservation is 
necessary to ensure that the long term goal is not derailed by short-term 
fl uctuations of either public fi nance or political will.189 In this regard, the 
UK regime that allows the government to claw back the compensation paid 
out in the event that the government reverses its decision on preservation 
(eg if a later assessment fi nds that development should be allowed at the 
monument) helps mitigate the problem to a certain extent by reducing 
the fi scal costs of any mistaken monument declaration. However, because 
this rule only provides a fi scal benefi t in the future, there is limited impact 
on the incentives of the current government in light of possible changes 
in the ruling party. Thus, a regular commitment to a fund designated for 
historical preservation would be preferable.
compensation. A conjecture is that the government side-stepped the issue to avoid setting an 
excessively high compensation precedent that may impede future conservation efforts.
186 Kelly (n 175 above), p 952.
187 Brown and Stroup (n 1 above), pp 230–231.
188 See above Part IV.D.
189 See Baohui Zhang, “Political Paralysis of the Basic Law Regime and the Politics of Institutional 
Reform in Hong Kong” (2009) 49(2) Asian Survey 312, 315–318 and 320–321 (discussing the 
political paralysis that impedes effective policy initiatives).
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VI. Conclusion
The Ho Tung Gardens saga highlights the considerations that are relevant 
to a well-designed compensation regime for historical preservation. The 
positive shaping of public discourse by the normatively desirable but 
legally fl awed assumption of signifi cant compensation underscores the 
importance of adequate compensation to constrain the government 
decision-making process and to create proper private incentives for 
historical conservation. However, the Ho Tung Gardens saga revealed 
the risks of fi scal pressure and the incoherency of the distinction between 
in-kind and monetary compensation when the conservation effort was 
ultimately thwarted by the potential expenditure of signifi cant amounts 
of public funds for compensation.
Legislative reform is imperative. The compensation provision of 
the Ordinance should clearly stipulate the basis of compensation as 
the reduction in the value of the property caused by the development 
restrictions of monument declaration. This may be achieved by importing 
the language from compensation provisions in either the UK Ancient 
Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act or Hong Kong’s Country Parks 
Ordinance, although care must be taken to ensure that compensation 
includes the reduction in land value arising from other regulatory actions 
that are motivated by heritage conservation. In addition, there should be 
no differences in procedures for payment of in-kind compensation and 
monetary compensation. Finally, a regular fi nancial commitment should 
be made to historical preservation. These reforms will help ensure that 
the Ordinance properly advance the goals of historical preservation in an 
environment of ever-increasing fi scal and development pressures.
On a broader level, the Ho Tung Gardens saga is an illustrative case 
study of how the incentive perspective may illuminate inquiry into 
regulatory takings. The design of any regulatory scheme must account 
for the incentives and abilities of the affected private entities to avoid 
fi nancially damaging regulatory burdens. In particular, the provision 
of adequate compensation is critical for regulatory schemes in which 
targeted private entities can reduce the risk of regulatory burdens by 
simply destroying the very object the regulatory scheme intends to 
protect. Regulators should not underestimate the initiative of property 
owners to advance their interests under any regulatory regime.
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